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“All teachers, clerks, and businessman – step forward!” Languishing in the Jagersdorf
German internment camp at the beginning of June 1945, Hubert Schutz was lined up against a
demolished public building for labor selection by a Czech political squad known as a National
Committee. This Committee, a squad formed some three weeks prior as the Soviet armies
liberated the Bohemian city of Ostrava, was now responsible for guarding thousands of Germans
in the camps. A fellow German internee designated as a labor commander asked Schutz for his
identification documents. Upon producing his Reichdokuments, proving Schutz to be a town
mayor lacking any formal technical skill, he was led to a truck where he would be sent to the
Witkowitz iron foundry for manual hard labor as a coal hauler. After three months of little food
and backbreaking labor, Schutz devolved pneumonia and dysentery and was designated for
expulsion to Soviet occupied Silesia.1
Schutz’s situation was fairly common in the ethnically German Sudetenland in the
aftermath of the Second World War. The iron foundry he worked for had recently been
nationalized, like most other Sudeten industries, and forced labor was instituted to run the
economy until Czech settlers could arrive. Similar expulsions would transform the
demographics, economics, and social foundation of the Sudeten territories. In order to
accomplish the massive demographic feat of moving over 30% of the population of the Czech
lands, the government sanctioned the use of homegrown Czech partisan groups in order to lead
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the administration of expelled territories. These Czech partisans, known as the Revolutionary
Guards, flooded into the territory in the wake of the advancing Soviet armies and became the
administrative authority over approximately 3 million ethnic Germans and the lands they were
forced to vacate.
The German expulsions would inspire massive shifts in the political orientation of the
Sudetenland with drastic consequences for the Czechoslovak state. Within just a year the
Sudetenland would shift political allegiance decisively towards the Communist KSC party. In the
1946 general elections, the KSC captured over 75% of the Sudetenland votes2 and had become a
bastion of Communist support.3 The Sudetenland would become one of the centerpieces of
Communist political strategy into the late 1940’s and spearheaded many reforms that would
enter the entire country following the 1948 Communist coup. However, why did Communists
benefit so greatly from the tremendous shifts that occurred in the territory? What was the greater
role of the Sudetenland in the spread of Communist enthusiasm to the Czechoslovak country as a
whole?
The Communists support can be drawn back to a number of critical developments in the
post-war period. Communist local support was able to take root in the Sudetenland through the
implementation of local power structures known as National Committees. This was dictated in
the Czechoslovak governments rebuilding program that directed inclusion policies that allowed
the Committees to lean heavily Communist in the Sudetenland. This local power structure was
able to influence wave after wave of incoming Czech Sudeten settlers towards the infectious
reforms of the Communist KSC party. Moreover, the vast amounts of now uninhabited former2

For reference, in the 1946 general election the KSC captured just over 40% of the entire vote in the Czech lands
with roughly 50% of the KSC votes coming from the Sudetenland. The electoral success in Czechoslovakia was the
best electoral success a communist party in Europe would receive by a large margin.
3
Miloslav Bernášek, “Czechoslovak Planning 1945-1948”, Journal of Soviet Studies 22, no. 1 (July 1970), 97.

2

German territory precipitated a mass resettling of the Sudetenland by ethnic Czechs who sought
a better economic and social future in the region. To this end, a large proportion of those who
arrived were in favor of reforms such as collectivized agrarian policies and nationalization of
industries. These policies were enacted on a large scale in the Sudetenland and generated
significant support for the Communist party that advocated for them. Fundamentally, the Czech
people genuinely expressed Communist enthusiasm after the aftermath of the Second World War
that Communists captured with their economic and political campaign in the Sudetenland. The
Communists were not seen as extremists and a successful propaganda campaign enhanced their
mystique. Communism began to be seen as the logical savior of the nation where previously
capitalism and fascism had failed them and were enthusiastic about the changing future of the
country. Communist leaders did all they could to convince the Czechoslovak people that
Communists were both homegrown and dedicated to furthering economic opportunities. The
Sudetenland would inevitably become one of the most reliable Communist bastions in the years
following the German expulsions. One of the greatest benefits to the Communists was the
socializing influence the Sudetenland would produce on the entire country. It seems the coup that
later occurred under the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Klement Gottwald coincided with
socialization of the Sudetenland and the rest of the country thereafter. The demographic shifts in
the Sudetenland territories as a result of the German expulsions would foster the inundation of
Communist support throughout Czechoslovakia that would eventually ease the path to power
during the 1948 communist coup.
The Sudetenland has always maintained an important position in most scholars’
discussions on Communist support in Czechoslovakia, but only to the extent that such support
existed as an enclave. Dialogue is sparse on the magnitude of the Sudeten contribution to the
3

transition of Czechoslovakia to a Communist state and almost non-existent on the nationwide
socialization encouraged by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.4 Until recently,
historiography on Communist Czechoslovakia as a whole was largely dominated by the Western
democracies interpretation under the ideological filter imposed by the Cold War. Works written
before the end of the cold war attribute the Communist takeover to a group of power-hungry
leaders that consolidated power with the direct support of the Soviet Union. Karel Kaplan, one of
the leading historians on Czechoslovak Communism during the Cold War, explains the coup was
imposed by a combination of liberating Soviet armies and local security forces. Kaplan observes
the undercurrent of some political support for Communism before 1948, but explains the success
of the coup can be limited “to one, and the decisive side - power politics.”5 Under this
interpretation, political power was snatched from a disorganized democratic opposition by a
small handful of Communists with overwhelming force. Communist strategy developed to
outmaneuver the democratic process and not to attract support within its structure. Kaplan’s tone
is further reflected in authors written accounts that use words such as “subversion” and
“conquest” to describe the transition to Communist power.6 The Cold War analysis of the events
in post-war Czechoslovakia, embodied by Karel Kaplan’s work, would dramatically change after
the fall of Czechoslovak Communism in 1989.
Current historians have attempted to eschew the one dimensional Cold War works in
favor of a more balanced approach that claims Communism in Czechoslovakia was the result of
4
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both seizures of power and a function of groundswell popular support that lent the coup
legitimacy. The examination of a great deal of archival evidence previously unavailable to
researchers from Czechoslovak archives helped challenge the Cold War consensus. Recent
Literature redefines the popular support that the Communists enjoyed on their rise to power.7
The Communists maintained broad post-war enthusiasm as the best political party for the future
for the nation and were able to successfully foster the “revision of the national character”.8 The
Communists translated modest popular support into a weapon against a fragmented democratic
opposition by gaining at least partial acceptance of the Communist interpretation of a
Czechoslovak democracy. This interpretation included the initiation of more socialist programs,
greater Communist influence in key policy decisions, and installation in certain key positions of
power. Though strong-arm tactics did play an essential role in the 1948 coup, it was by no means
the only reason they were able to take power. The popular support they had created weakened
the post-war Czechoslovak democracy as more power was concentrated under their control. The
coup may have succeeded with the help of the military, but by that point the battle had already
been won by the Communists.
The assertion of Communist popular support can help explain the events during the 1948
coup and the socialization of the Czech lands as a whole. It seems the Sudetenland
unintentionally acted as one of the major catalysts for the creation of widespread Communist
acceptance. Sudeten regional support would be funneled into the Czechoslovak interior though a
variety of Communist sponsored political, social, and economic policies that gained them
popular recognition. The ethnic German expulsions would indirectly begin an unstoppable
7
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process of socialization that ballooned Communist political support in the region.9 The intensive
demographic shifts that resulted by the German expulsions presented the Czechoslovak
Communists with an incredible opportunity to transform the political orientation of the nation.

The Path to Expulsion
The frictions between Ethnic Germans and Czechs began well before the occupation by
Nazi Germany necessitated the expulsions. The Czech lands, encompassing the provinces of
Bohemia and Moravia, had undergone intensive periods of Germanization in politics under
Austrian Habsburg rule since 1620. The Czech language was forbidden from state administration
and the Catholic German nobility sponsored religious persecution against Protestants who
formed 95% of the Czech population.10 Germanization only began to subside after the 19th
century Czech National Revival movement pushed for the official restoration of the Czech
language in the Czech lands and provided for more Czech political incorporation. Yet despite
minor tensions, ethnic coexistence had always been a foundation of the Czech lands. Ethnic
Germans had remained an important facet of the local population since their migration to the
Slavic realms in the early 13th century. German and Czech society was well integrated and while
political tensions were usually divided along ethnic lines, this did not reflect any major societal
unrest. However, the breakup of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire after World War I signaled a
shift in the ethnic dynamic. The newly created First Czechoslovak Republic was relatively stable
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but centralized political control meant nationalism simmered amongst non-Czechs throughout
the interwar period.11 Czechs dominated both the central government and most national
institutions and nationalist movements began to form in the early 1930’s aimed towards the
formation of broader political autonomy.
The Sudetendeustche Partei (SpD) formed in 1932 under Konrad Henlein and became
increasingly vocal for federalization of the Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia. Sudeten
Germans felt marginalized by the political system and believed the strong industries in the
Sudetenland were subsidizing less developed provinces. By 1935, the Sudetenland also faced
economic stagnation and 12 percent unemployment that contributed to the general unrest.12
Sudeten dissatisfaction was reflected in the elections of that year where the SdP captured 68% of
the German vote and over 15% of the entire parliamentary vote to make them the strongest party
in Czechoslovakia. Feeling increasingly emboldened, Henlein began to gather ties to the
National Socialists in Hitlerite Germany as a powerful ally to push for Sudeten interests.
Hitler first proposed plans for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany during his
first meeting with Konrad Henlien in mid-1937. There he expressed his ultimate goal to bring the
Czech lands under a greater Germany in line with his slogan, “one people, one empire, one
leader!”13 During the meeting Henlein agreed to urge the 1.35 million members of the SdP to
demand for a self-governing Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia in order to create a crisis.
Thereafter, Henlein issued an ultimatum under conditions dictated by Hitler that were impossible
to meet without compromising Czechoslovak national sovereignty. Under pretexts of diffusing
11
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the crisis, Hitler urged action on the Czechoslovak issue within the international community. The
successful annexation of Austria to Germany earlier that year had met little western criticism and
Hitler believed Britain and France would surely fold under German pressure. British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain and French president Albert Lebrun were determined to avoid
another European war and duly conceded to German demands for the annexation of the
Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak government had little choice but to accept the German
ultimatum for annexation of the Sudetenland and the resulting rump government was too weak to
challenge German demands in 1939 that forced the Czech lands into a protectorate under
German authority.14 With the entirety of Czechoslovakia now under his control, Hitler set out to
make the Sudetenland an “entirely German homeland” and began transferring ethnic Czechs to
the protectorate. This established a precedent for ethnic expulsions during the 5 years of German
occupation and greatly antagonized ethnic Czechs desire for retribution after harsh occupation
rule.
Czech nationals regarded the abandonment of their western allies as a ‘stab in the back’
that had undermined their national sovereignty. The Czechoslovaks were now faced with the
reality that alignment with western democracies was no guarantee of territorial protection. Faced
with the occupation of the entire country, the Czechoslovak government formed in exile in
Britain until Czechoslovakia could be liberated.15 Once the government was setup in London,
rebuilding policies began to foment for the expected liberation of Czechoslovakia. One key
debate amongst Czech politicians centered on the issue of how to handle the ethnic Germans that
14
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had betrayed the nation. Initial plans discussed how ethnic Germans might be accommodated in
a new state structure. For instance, the president of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, initially
resurrected the idea of cantons that would be ethnically homogenous within Czechoslovakia and
could accommodate ethnic Germans.16 However, an increasing number of Czech nationalists
believed no solution was possible and were in favor of the radical cleansing of the entire nation
of all Germans. The demands of this group coincided with the escalation of the war on
continental Europe and the ferocity of German occupation and forced Beneš to consider more
radical proposals. Beneš agreed that the Sudeten German population had essentially perpetrated
treason by agitating for the alignment with Nazi Germany that occurred in the 1938 Munich
agreement. Despite centuries of coexistence, many believed the wounds would be too deep to
heal amongst the Czechoslovak people that demanded justice for occupation. Moreover, Beneš
wanted to eliminate all possibility of future claims by Germany upon Czechoslovak territory that
could result from a remaining German minority.17 Beneš decided the best option available would
simply be to expel Ethnic Germans from the Czech lands into Germany. The proposal was given
full allied support and the German population would be transferred out of Czechoslovakia at the
wars end to create a homogenous nation for the Czech people.18
The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the war in June 1941 was critical in the formation of
a post-war rebuilding policy that included the expulsions. Many Czechoslovak Communists had
fled to Moscow after the occupation of the country and created a Czechoslovak Communist
delegation there. There the Czechoslovak Communists sought to foster dialogue between the
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Czechoslovak government-in-exile and the Soviet government in order to influence the political
orientation of a liberated Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London had
also sought to increase ties with their Soviet counterparts as the Soviet Union would undoubtedly
become the liberating force for the whole of Eastern Europe. In December of 1943, the
Czechoslovak Communists in Moscow signed a formal declaration of friendship, ratified by
Edvard Beneš, announcing “close and friendly cooperation after re-establishment of peace”19
with the Soviet Union. The declaration included members from both the government-in-exile and
the Communist delegation and bound the signatories into a pact of cooperation. In order to
prepare the liberating government in 1944, the Soviet Union mediated the creation of the
Czechoslovak governmental organization that gave positions of power to both voices of
democracy and Communists. Once Czechoslovakia was liberated, the government would be a
coalition of democrats and Communists that would implement the reconstruction and
administration of the country.
The result would be the so called Beneš Decrees and the Kosice Program. Of primary
importance for returning President Eduard Benes was the complete redesign the Sudetenland
territory with the mandate of the Allied forces in Europe. Beneš had explored the idea of German
expulsion for those who were disloyal or who were proven fascists. However, British Foreign
secretary Anthony Eden warned Beneš that individual guilt would put a “restrictive mechanism
on the number of expellees” and instead any expulsions should occur under the collective guilt of
being ethnically German.20 Thusly, the Kosice program did not distinguish between ethnic
Germans and allowed Czechs to see all Germans as national enemies. Only those who could
19
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prove their loyalty to the Czechoslovak government would be allowed to stay. The consequences
would be felt in the harsh conditions German expellees would soon endure. The Czech
communists had a large say in the framing of the Kosice program and exerted a large amount of
influence in the actual actions on how the program would be carried out. The newly formed
Czechoslovak Interior Ministry, heavily staffed by Communists, sanctioned the use of violence
in against ethnic Germans. While moderates in the Czechoslovak government urged restraint to
halt an impending humanitarian crisis that could reflect poorly on the nation in the eyes of the
West, the more radical organs of government were encouraging the mob. Deputy Prime minister
Klement Gottwald continued to use terminology such as the “liquidation” and “cleansing” of
territories of German ethnicity.21 The Communists within government sought favorable political
conditions in the expelled areas and sought the key provision on province administration. The
Communists were successful in petitioning the coalition government to add to the Kosice
program a provision detailing the “confiscation of landed estate and of the property connected
with it [to] be carried out without compensation by the competent National Committees.”22 This
provision became one of the linch pins of the Communist party’s political gains in the
Sudetenland area. The provision distinguished that all confiscated properties would be
nationalized by the state pending its redistribution to Czech settlers. Many Czech came to equate
this initially popular provision with the Communists who had been so vocal about it benefits and
Communist leaders from the interior ministry became the figureheads of the program. The
Kosice program became the basis for the administration of Czechoslovakia and was further
critical in the development of the local National Committees for local administration.
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Communist Utilization of the National Committees
The Kosice programs authorized the creation of National Committee’s that became
disproportionately staffed by Communist leaning groups and used this local power to consolidate
provincial political control. During the following period of rapid changes, the reorganization of
the political structure would be dominated by spontaneous generation of National Committees
with encouragement from vocal Czech leaders. The new Czech cabinet called upon the local
groups of citizens who had demonstrated “their worth as fighters against the invaders and traitors
and [had] shown their true patriotic feelings” to form the core of these new local administrative
groups.23 Given this encouragement, National Committees grew around a core of local Czech
partisans who had resisted Nazi occupation. In many cases, heads of National Committees in the
Sudetenland had been the leaders of their local partisan groups who had instigated small-time
sabotage. The committees were directly instructed to, “administer all public affairs within their
spheres of competence [;] will, together with central authorities, take measures in the interest of
public security [;] and will set up a democratic machine of officials, subordinate to
themselves.”24 The National Committees would function under the umbrella of the Communist
controlled interior ministry and were heavily responsible for the administration of the
Sudetenland. One of the major initial challenges for the young Czechoslovak government was
the patchwork of authority created by the chaos of liberation. Communist Prime Minister
Klement Gottwald wrote that one of the intents of the National Committees was that the
Czechoslovak government “could consolidate the state-political and state-power organs of the
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people, that is [through] the National Committees.”25 The decentralization of sources of power,
especially in the liberated Sudetenland, became increasingly apparent upon the arrival of Eduard
Benes and the official transitory government into Prague on May 13, 1945. The Kosice Program
had articulated the structure, criteria, and design of the post-war administration of Czech
provinces but their implementation was affected by the realities of liberation. It was through the
method of liberation that the National Committees would become staffed with a vast majority of
Communist supporters in key Sudetenland areas. It seems the joint American and Soviet thrusts
into Bohemia had ramifications for the development of the National Committees and the political
policies that followed in the Sudetenland.
The foundation of the National committees accelerated quickly on the heels of the Soviet
Red Army thrust into Bohemia. The Soviet advance through Moravia and into Bohemia was
swift and arrived in two waves. The first wave of combat troops was undisciplined in their
advance on ethnically German areas. The Soviet Army under General Alexi Antonov had pushed
into Czech lands from Slovakia and had faced German armies extensively in Ukraine. As such,
many Soviet divisions planned to exact revenge upon ethnic Germans whom were seen as
inhuman as depicted by Soviet propaganda. Many Sudeten Germans were immediately
brutalized and sent to internment camps and German depopulation would occur rather swiftly
within the next few months under Soviet supervision. The following wave consisted mainly of
occupation troops who were equally undisciplined. Among this wave was the First Czechoslovak
Army Corps who had previously been incorporated into the Soviet Red Army and had fought in
Russia. This army was declared in the Kosice program as the basis for the national army of
liberated Czechoslovakia that would institute order in tandem with Soviet forces. Accordingly,
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the organization of the Czechoslovak army paralleled the Soviets and received every form of
training, political education, and pro-Soviet propaganda that did a regular Red Army solider.
President Benes and the government seated at Kosice decided this to be a necessary step in order
to stamp out the reemergence of ‘subversive elements’ of Czech society such as collaborators.
The Kosice program detailed that, “in order that [the] army be trained in a civic, democratic, and
anti-fascist spirit, the government wishes to put an end once and for all to the so-called
‘unpolitical army’.”26 Education officers, all communist due to the communist controlled interior
ministry, were attached to every brigade. The result was an army heavily influenced by their
socialist education and in charge of the reconstruction of the Czech lands. In figures released 6
months after the end of hostilities, over 2/3 of the army voted communist.27 This would be
transformative for more than just the military occupation of the country. Partisans were an
actively encouraged element in the army formation and would be fully integrated into occupation
once peace was achieved.28 Homegrown Czech partisans were encouraged to participate in army
functions and received similar political indoctrination under directive to conduct the
“revolutionary phase” of the reconstruction. The partisans that had served under the First
Czechoslovak Army Corp would arrive in many of the German areas of the Sudetenland before
any other governmental groups. It seems the explicit state endorsement of partisan control meant
that National Committees were constituted heavily of socialist former partisans who arrived with
the Red Army. One German interned at the large Pankrac internment camp wrote one such
National Committee member welcomed Germans into the camps as “comrades” and declared
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that they “are genuine communists here and woe to those who try to keep us out!”29 Inevitably,
this would shift the balance of power toward the Communists in many Sudetenland provinces.
Conversely, American military forces had advanced to the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line
and set up military order in a much smaller 3,800 km triangle of territory in the west of the
country. American occupation was very dissimilar from the Soviet occupation to the east. The
Czech lands constituted a liberated allied nation and the US Army sought to remain temporarily
to help rebuild and reorganize the territories. Retribution against Germans or political
indoctrination did not occur to the extent that it did in the east. In Sudeten territories, National
Committees worked alongside the Americans in administrative duties. The Committees that were
established under American occupation were not a primary source of order in the Sudetenland
but merely represented a political force. Initially, socialism was not introduced to American held
territories under the external pressure like that of the east. Moreover, expulsions did not occur
with the same ferocity that it did under the Soviets despite American occupied areas counting for
some of the largest concentrations of Sudeten Germans. The Czechoslovak government even
commented to the U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia that U.S. soldiers were “too friendly with
Sudeten Germans in occupied areas”.30 In contrast to Soviet areas of the Sudetenland, Germans
were only being expelled into American occupied sections of Germany incrementally from a
variety of internment camps and the many remaining German towns and cities. However,
following the surrender of Japan, the American presence began to quickly fade. In September of
1945, Germans began to be expelled in great numbers from the American section as Czech
National Committees were handed control of local order. However, since few areas in the
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Sudetenland contained a Slav majority, a number of local National Committees had to be
constituted of immigrants from eastern Czech lands. By the end of the summer of 1945, the
Sudetenland had been consolidated under the Communist interior ministry through the National
Committees. Klement Gottwald expressed great pleasure at the initial socialization of the
National Committees and secretly marveled that “[the democratic opposition] did not imagine
the National Committees as an organ of government which would have wide authority” and “the
National Committees are the main arena of political struggle.”31 The influence of the National
Committees in Sudeten territories would be fundamental in the shift in political power towards
increasing socialism.

Socialization of the Sudeten Economy
One major advantage of the powers granted to the National Committees was the
implementation of the socialist economic policies that were envisaged by Communist members
of the central government. Most Czech citizens had come to find capitalism and political
fragmentation, evident in the inter-war Republic, as frontrunners of fascism and demanded an
overhaul of the system. As Eduard Benes argued from Kosice:
“Prewar democracy proved to have many deficiencies and in many countries it helped to
a great extent to bring about the advent of totalitarian dictatorships. It will have to be
reformed and fully regenerated. After [World War II] political democracy will have to
develop systematically and consistently into so-called economic and social democracy.”32
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Benes certainly did not argue for the imposition of radical Communism upon the social and
economic foundations of the country, but instead sought a program for the “socialization of
modern society.”33 Most saw it as a matter of necessity as much as it was a function of lofty
political ideals. In the aftermath of the Second World War, no political party seriously
considered anything but a platform of radical social and economic changes.
Czechoslovakia had undergone an intricate process of structural economic
transformations during German occupation that were similar to those experienced by most states
incorporated into the Reich’s war economy.34 In order to further their imperial ambitions,
Germans subjugated and incorporated the economies of its puppet states and allies. Consumer
goods industries were halted and redirected towards heavy goods and raw materials production
destined for Germany as the war demanded. The tremendous amounts of German capital that
flooded into the outlying states in the German sphere, especially the less developed countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, experienced sudden drastic economic growth and modernization.
Slovak Communist functionary, Gustav Husak, wrote a dispatch to Moscow evaluating that, “the
regime managed to solve economic problems to the surprise even of those who were favorably
inclined to the regime… the situation in Slovakia is better from the point of view both of real
wages and of the supply of goods.”35 However, the enormous economic growth came at the price
of local control of industry and almost all important sectors were expropriated from local control.
Thus, even before the influence of the Soviet Union style economies after the war, many Eastern
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European states were shifted away from western style capitalism and towards socialization. The
attractiveness of planned economies after the end of the Second World War belies the acceptance
of the shift towards a command structured economy that had already occurred under Nazi rule.
Czechoslovakia would become a near monolith of central economic control during the war and
would emerge as an essentially different economy then it had been pre-war.
The economic reforms that emerged after the war in Czechoslovakia sought to extend
central control further and the Sudetenland became a key area of policy implementation. It seems
the first phase of economic reforms accompanied the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Forced
expulsion would be immediately followed by the expropriation of German personal and public
property and plans to resettle Czechs from the interior of the country. The three month period of
rapid expulsion36 and acquisition by National Committees had previously taken place under the
auspices of the Kosice Program but property wasn’t yet explicitly nationalized. The central
government was able to accomplish this through the Decree for the Confiscation of Enemy
Property and the Creation of a fund of National Renewal (FNO) on October 25, 1945 to begin
the organized transfer of German property. The FNO further set up an administration to
reprivatize the confiscated property in conjunction with the National Committees. The transfers
of economic interests were intended to stabilize the Sudetenland and bring incentives for laborers
to resettle the vacant territory.
However, the transfers would be massive and challenging. During their occupation of the
Czech protectorate, German authorities had nationalized large amounts of property and forced
the displacement or removal of over 100,000 native Czechs. In fact, by the end of the war an
36

The initial expulsions are characterized by their haphazard nature and the conspicuous absence of central
government control. Expulsions were initially decentralized and characteristically violent in the first three months
after liberation.

18

incredible 60 to 70 percent of the entire country’s economic wealth was German-owned. Benes
recounted that the “Germans expropriated all key industries and banks, and in this way
automatically prepared the nationalization of Czechoslovak point of view… even though the
decision to administer it was in accordance with the principles of private enterprise.”37
Inevitably, the confiscations and subsequent expulsions proved to be devastating to the economy
of post-war Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland accounted for 75% of Czechoslovakia’s coal, 61%
of its textiles, 76% of glass production, 38.5% of its chemicals, 55% of its paper, and it held a
majority of many other crucial skilled industries.38 The expulsion of the German industrial
workers in these industries would have many immediate detrimental consequences.
The Czechoslovak government immediately realized the most pressing problem in the
Sudetenland was the massive labor shortage it now faced. Klement Gottwald remarked that
“following the transfer of the Germans, there will be a shortage of labor in industry of one-half
million” and would be exacerbated by lack of housing. The lack of many skilled laborers and
craftsman would shift the dynamics of the Czechoslovak economy away from traditional
consumer goods. Instead, like the economies of the Soviet Union, the result was an increasing
emphasis on the capital goods and other heavy industries that used unskilled labor. In many cases
the effect of labor shortages was so drastic that Germans were pressed into compulsory labor for
long periods of time and in a few cases even offered citizenship with German renunciation.
Germans remaining in the Sudetenland, especially skilled ones, were required for “types of
labour which fall within their own specialty” and were to become “the responsibility of the
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commissioner of the enterprise.”39 In many skilled enterprises, Germans served as the instructors
until the industry could become self-sufficient and then were duly expelled to Germany. All
other Germans would be transferred to heavy industry even if it did not suit them. One German
Professor from Prague sent to work the Sudetenland remarked in 1946 that “there were no
German workers in Prague - but the German intelligentsia of Prague was to be turned into
proletarians”40 His comments emphasize the rhetoric of communism that was directly imposed
on all major industries in the Sudetenland. In dire straits, the central government believed the
problems could only be solved through resettlement and collectivization that were used to further
Communist propaganda from the interior ministry.
Considering the drastic drop that resulted from the loss of German skilled labor and the
seemingly insurmountable challenge of restoring pre-war efficiency, the resettlement of the
Sudetenland became the first priority. The resettlement of Czech laborers into the Sudetenland
mirrors the phases of the German expulsions. During the “wild transfer” (Divoky odsun), where
partisan bands and Red Army units immediately forced Germans to abandon their property, the
expulsion is characterized by the equally haphazard wave of Czech settlers. These settlers were
largely opportunists that hoped to participate in the spoils of expulsion and acquire lucrative
work in vacant industries. Those who arrived did so in the hopes of becoming part of either the
local National Committees or selection as a “national administrator” of enterprises. Officially
National Committees were responsible for the selection of candidates for these positions from
those who initially arrived in the territory. The Kosice Program detailed the necessity of
“competent National Committees to see to it that every plot of ground in the area is at once
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exploited to the full, irrespective of its legal state of ownership.”41 However, due to the large
amount of businesses and enterprises to distribute, many enterprise administrators simply took
control of businesses on a first come first serve basis and were subsequently granted authority by
the National Committees. Oftentimes, the National Committees simply wanted to get production
restarted and would accept enterprise administrators on a temporary basis until a more qualified
employer could be found. This jockeying for better career position and standard of living became
one of the main reasons for settlers to arrive in the Sudetenland. By the end of this initial period,
80 percent of enterprises in the region had Czech national administrators representing some
12,000 plants, workshops, and enterprises.42 In conjunction with the administration of the
National Committees, individual enterprise production was resumed very soon after German
confiscations.
The second resettlement period, during the “forced expatriation” (nucene vysidleni) of
German expulsions, accounted for the vast majority of the eventual Sudeten settlers. Almost 2
million Czechs would eventually settle in the Sudetenland during this phase as Germans began to
leave in greater numbers.43 By the summer of 1946 over 900 workers a day entered Sudeten
factories and the Sudeten economy was recovering.44 However, the extensive government
resettlement plans in place were not immediately executed despite the substantial amount of
Germans expelled during the ‘wild transfer’. Benes government waited to implement centralized
resettlement plans mainly due to the severe deficiency of acceptable housing for settlers. Despite
nationalizing over 640,000 apartments and houses in the first 6 month period following
liberation, “some belonged to Czechs returning to the area, some were primitive even by interwar
41
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standards and others suffered war damage and needed reconstruction.”45 To facilitate the
reorganization of the Sudetenland, the Ministry of the Interior created the Settlement Office
(Osidlovaci urad) during the fall months. The Settlement Office was acutely aware of the mass
housing initiatives of the interwar period where “local, independent, and privately funded”
projects were often never completed or were no bigger than a single building.46 The solution was
to use state supported building projects to create acceptable housing that was jointly owned by
the state and private enterprise. This action was compatible with Benes’ plan to create a “modern
socialist state” and even the architecture of the buildings was required to be of a “socialist
design.”47 Until new housing could be constructed, the Settlement Office instructed Czech
settlers to move into hotels, provisional lodgings, or commonly into houses with the Germans
themselves. Most German families were required to open up the majority of their housing to
make room for Czechs.48 The vast majority of the incoming Czechs would have to wait until the
housing situation was alleviated and this limited huge numbers of initial settlers.
By 1946 the completion of a number of construction projects and the fulfillment of the
bulk of expulsions had opened enough housing to allow for full-scale resettlement operations.
The central plan envisioned Sudetenland areas resettled up to 75% of their pre-war population in
all the most critical economic areas. The transfers had reduced Czech population by over 25% so
as settlers arrived in an area already at a population maximum, they were directed to find
settlement in a different district.49 In this way the lucrative industrial areas were populated
quickly. However, total resettlement was nowhere near enough to compensate for the
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reinvigoration of the economy to pre-war levels. Part of this problem was the rootlessness of the
Czech settlers that arrived for factory work. Laborers were easily dissatisfied, had low-morale,
and were unwilling to put in the same work that Germans had put in. Moreover, having little
cultural or social connections to the area made leaving one job for another easily possible. As a
result the productivity per worker declined and contributed to the labor shortage as more laborers
were needed to reach similar output. The labor shortages had become so dire that even the
Czechoslovak army was forced to help out in the critical mining industry.50 Shortages occurred
most heavily in industries that were labor intensive and these were often the foundation of the
Sudeten economy. For example, the Stalin Works near Litomerce in Sudeten northwest
accounted for 96 percent of domestic consumption of fuel and supplied a large number of
factories with its output yet shortages required German compulsory labor.51 The Ministry of
Industry commissioned a statewide classification of industry to deal with the problem. Industries
were to be classified on their value and necessity to the Czechoslovak economy, their
productivity, and their profitability. Category A firms would represent critical industries for the
entire economy. Category B were those that were productive but could be shut down if required.
Finally, category C were marked as unproductive and scheduled for closure. The assets of
category C firms would usually be marked for distribution to other industries or even moved to
areas that could produce more effectively. Immediately, this became hugely unpopular to
laborers who settled under difficult conditions and feared the loss of their one benefit available in
abundant employment. Communist National Committees however were able to take advantage of
the impending plant closures by vocally advocating against them and in many cases simply
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ignoring the directives of the Ministry of Industry. The closure of a plant within their
administration would limit their power and hurt their prestige. Many laborers took note of the
actions of the National Committees and attributed successes to the Communists.
It seems the economic transformation of the Sudetenland resulted in numerous political
consequences that further reinforced the Communist position. The Communists celebrated their
political inroads and Communist influence in the Sudetenland was a major factor in the success
the KSC party garnered in the 1946 parliamentary elections. The Communist involvement in the
National Committees and the subsequent socialist influence they were able to achieve in Sudeten
areas was mirrored by their inroads into the successful economic policy. Gradually, the KSC
party made significant gains in the Sudeten areas and their local communities and Communist
patronage was rewarded in the 1946 parliamentary elections. The 1946 elections would prove the
key watershed moment in transfer of Sudeten Communist enthusiasm into both electoral gains
and general socialist influence throughout the country. The Benes government, with Communist
prodding, issued a decree immediately before the elections in May requiring that National
Committee representation be based upon the results of the general parliamentary vote. This
would be critical for the consolidation of Communist rule throughout the entirety of the Czech
lands as it allowed Communist votes in majority areas to overcome the democratic opposition’s
votes. The Communists were able to secure majorities in almost all of the Sudetenland in the
general elections and in most cases the support was higher than 75%. The distribution of Czech
electoral districts was such that the large proportion of Communist votes in the Sudetenland
watered down the significance of the general slight democratic opposition majorities in the
interior of the outer districts. The consequences for a democratic influence became immediately
clear as Communists handily won 138 of the 163 districts in the Czech lands with 40% of the
24

vote.52 The vote was all the more influenced by the recent implementation of land reform that
redistributed agricultural lands. Klement Gottwald hailed the historic vote for the KSC and
believed the “Communist party has such influence that it is able to assert itself.”53 The economic
transformation of the Sudetenland was generally seen as a success in the eyes of many Czech
commoners and the presence of Communists at all levels of the country lent them legitimacy.
The KSC could now approach issues in parliament with a majority and the democratic forces
were no longer on an even playing field in politics. Further, the majority of Communist support
came from the Sudeten areas and was able to redraw the electoral map by overcoming the
democratic support in many parts of the exterior. Sudeten support was a major factor in the
Czech lands shift towards direct Communist political control after the elections of 1946.

Shifting Czechoslovak Cultural Attitude
The socializing economic reforms attributed to the KSC and the overall progressive
appearance of the party tied in well with the general KSC campaign to capture the national
enthusiasm. The Communists were immediate in furthering political support once power had
infiltrated most Czech areas by launching an effective propaganda campaign designed to
convince Czechoslovaks of their ‘socialist history’.54 The communists sought to utilize the wave
of changing values and increased nationalism for the “revision of the national character.”55
Aware that patronage and political influence could only further the communist cause to a degree,
52

Ther and Siljak. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe 1944-1948, 251.
Klement Gottwald, Memoirs of Klement Gottwald, 59.
54
The KSC launched a campaign in 1946 denoting the socialist nature of Czechoslovak national hero’s such as the
Tomas Masaryk and 16th century local protestant sect missionary Jan Hus. The campaign portrayed the history of
Czechoslovakia as a people constantly under oppression from Austrians nobility, capitalist doctrines, and then
Germans. This stifled the Czechoslovak inherent socialist Slavic nature. Bradley Abrams book The Struggle for the
Soul of the Nation lays out a decent overview of the socialized historical campaign.
55
Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistance. 176.
53

25

the communists sought to capture the sympathies of Czechoslovak people for political ends. It
seems the elections of 1946 marked a turning point for the communist embrace of this shift in
national character as an endorsement by the people. The ordinary Czech began to increasingly
sympathize with the communists that offered “material rewards or power, or both, as
compensation for the years of suffering.”56 The KSC had begun planning the elements for a
culture campaign immediately after liberation but the legitimization offered by the elections
meant political rhetoric could begin as well. The communist Minister of Information Vaclav
Kopecky hailed the “new era of our new Czechoslovak culture” and the communist-leaning
newspaper Tvorba called for “a critical revision of everything that seemed stable for ages… a
great revaluation of all values.”57 For the Communists, a revision of the Czechoslovak
perspective on issues both economic and political was necessary.
To this end, Klement Gottwald began using the “Czechoslovak road to socialism” to
describe the economic and social transformations that the Communists had popularized. The
class warfare and social upheaval of Marxism could be abandoned for the peaceful
transformation of the Czechoslovak Communists. The introduction of the Two-Year Plan
following the 1946 elections began the further application of the economic and social changes
that were to form the basis for the ensuing political strategy. The Two-Year Plan instituted
national targets on rebuilding economic and social structures and was similar to those policies
implemented into the Sudetenland. Many communists were eager to institute these further
reforms state-wide to Czechoslovakia that had now been tested and were so politically expedient
for their cause. Communist Gustav Bares declared the plan as changing “not only the economy,
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but also social relations, morality and the people themselves.”58 The acceptance of this was so
great that even President Benes and the fragmented democratic opposition did not oppose
programs that were clearly to their political detriment. Communist controlled state organs began
to take advantage of this and began to actively engineer a strategy to impact the convictions of
the masses. The end of party parity in favor of the communists following the 1946 parliamentary
elections was used to strengthen communist’s image as a non-radical party for general progress.
Moreover, the KSC began to become involved in extra-political organizations to increase
their influence and sharpen their support. KSC leadership hoped to push for further
nationalizations of Czech industry and the collectivization of farms. However, backlash from
other political parties in the National Front remained stiff and plans to push greater socialist
reforms had to be shelved temporarily. In order to continue communist reforms the communist
government began to rely on the use of trade unions. Unlike the fragmented post-war trade union
system that was split along party lines, the Nazi occupation favored consolidation and liquidation
into a single trade union, the Revolucni Odborove Hnuti (ROH), which would be easier to
control. The communists were immediately aware of the benefit of the ROH. The possible
support of such a massive centralized trade union made groundswell support unnecessary as the
organization had over 1.8 million members.59 Moreover, ROH organization structure was
organized by region and district instead of trade or industry so as to ensure the continued unity
within the organization. Centralized control of the pyramid superstructure would mean
coordinated organizational policy was easily achieved. By 1946 the communists had taken
control of key positions in the ROH by the placement of National Committees and pressure from
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the KSC party leadership. The ROH became a reliable arm of the Communist party from which
they could institute further social changes.
The first such change took shape in 1946 as the Foundation Program was legislated in
parliament under communist sponsorship to benefit the economy nation-wide. The program
detailed the rebuilding of the national economy with special provisions for the Sudetenland to
meet the somewhat greater challenges of reconstruction. Under this cover, the communist party
was able to pass legislation that was essentially the same as the Eighth KSC Congress platform.60
The program finalized the last of the German expulsions and the Czech resettlement and
introduced programs to capitalize on the post-war patriotism of the workers. To compensate for
the labor shortages, the workers would be encouraged to participate in the “national mobilization
of labor” on the basis of patriotism and personal honor.61 Zdanek Radvanovsky explains that the
effect of the mobilizations returned “qualified workers to their occupations convince people
without jobs to do productive work, ensure that the most important productive sectors would
attract new talent, and increase the number of working women.” The program went into effect
during the spring of 1946 and seemingly produced an impact on the Sudetenland. The labor
shortages began to slightly decline and the Sudetenland was able to meet the daunting industrial
targets of 10% growth in 1946.62 Laborers in the mining industry even organized “national
shifts” on a voluntary basis that added extra working hours and work on Sundays. However, the
program was not a compulsory program and the communist reforms required workers
organizations and trade unions to inspire participation on the basis of civic duty. The Foundation
Program in the Sudetenland may have only produced marginal economic benefits, yet the value
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of the program might be better assessed as a means of communist participation. Within months
of the Sudeten measures, similar rebuilding efforts were launched through the ROH into other
Czech districts. This contributed to the view that the KSC was a patriot party above a communist
party and lent the party the critical support it sought to build heading into the 1948 general
elections.

Conclusion
The previous two and a half years had seen stunning victories for the KSC within the
democratic post-war confines. The Sudetenland was proven to be the centerpiece of their
stunning infiltration of political power and support at all political levels. The seizure of the
National Committee positions in 1945 as the German expulsions heated up had allowed the
communists to expand their base to over 1.5 million Czechoslovakians and the support largely
remained.63 Moreover, the expulsion of the German population was exploited by communists
who realized the opportunity 40,000 sq. km of vacant land presented for the socialization of the
territory. The National Committees were often the first legal administrators that settlers and
partisans encountered upon entering the Sudeten territory from the interior. As such, the
Committees were especially responsible for the political indoctrination the incoming Czechs had
received. The influence resulted in the transformation of the borderlands a bastion of communist
support. The support of the Sudetenland was critical in turning the tide against the democratic
forces and introduced communist administrators into areas that had remained democratic until
that point.
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The communist local and state organs were able to proceed with their experimentation
with the socialization of the Sudetenland and this became a proving ground for economic policy.
Policy introduced into the Sudetenland as rebuilding measures would precede its introduction
into the rest of Czechoslovakia when the general introduction of such policies followed the
communist electoral victory of 1946. Moreover, the economy of the Sudetenland had come to
drastically change the perceptions that ordinary Czech held on various communist economic
policies and their place within Czechoslovakia. Czechs had come to view communists with
enthusiasm and believed they should become the legitimate authority of the people after their
economic success.
Of greater implication for the German expulsions in the Sudetenland and underlying
socialist agenda that took hold is the connection to the broader Eastern European Communist
experience. Communists groups in most countries liberated by the Soviet Red Army seized the
opportunity of wartime trauma at the hands of the occupying Germans to further their own image
and enthusiasm amongst the local population.64 They trumpeted their valiant resistance during
state liberation in an active collaboration between the Soviets and Communist partisans. Much
like similar myths that permeated other countries throughout Europe, Czechoslovaks had a
significant interest in growing the fabrication of resistance towards an external German threat.65
Communists were especially motivated to carry out the expulsion of Germans from
Czechoslovakia to corroborate this myth amongst the Czechoslovak people. The collective guilt
ascribed to ethnic Germans made it significantly easier to indulge the Czechoslovak resentment
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and perhaps even embarrassment over German occupation. The expulsions in the Sudetenland
became a vessel with which the Czechoslovakia could revise their national character while also
homogenizing a multi-ethnic state.
The KSC became the heir to the post-war legacy in both organization and spirit which
they actively encouraged. Citizens felt that Communist action was the only national recourse
after the devastations that they believed democratic and capitalist values had brought them at the
end of the interwar period. Communist influence was celebrated with enthusiasm as the
progression in a long march towards normalization of the Czechoslovak territory. By the end of
1947, Klement Gottwald had built up enough political, popular, and economic capital that the
democratic process could safely be discarded. The existence of a democracy was all but a farce
as most real power positions were under communist control and the nation only needed a small
push to send it over the edge. Prime Minister Klement Gottwald entered Prague’s old town
square in late February with the support of the military and from there communist revolution
swept the country. Almost no violence accompanied the coup and democratic leaders resigned
voluntarily further illustrating the general mood of acceptance toward communist rule. The
Sudetenland became a watershed of communist change immediately after the liberation of the
country and played perhaps the most important role in the transformation of the country. The
territory was on the communist cutting edge of reforms politically, socially, culturally, and
economically and would funnel communist values into the Czech interior. The Sudetenland
served as the final puzzle piece that pushed the threshold of Communist support to the point
where Communists could realistically realize their ambitions for power. Ultimately, the
Sudetenland became the centerpiece of the KSC strategy to induce the socialization of the
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entirety of Czechoslovakia and the drastic demographic changes there allowed the Communists
both opportunity and legitimacy necessary to achieve national political control.
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